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ABSTRACT 
The United States has made the spread of democracy one of its foreign 
policy pillars.  Partial conflict analysis presents a means for examining the 
democratization process and developing an optimized solution in order to 
achieve this goal.  This thesis explores two approaches to democratization: top-
down and bottom-up.  A top-down approach begins by building civic identity 
through the establishment of liberal institutions that foster democratic ideals at 
the national level and propagate down to the individual.  A bottom-up approach 
begins by developing social capital within individuals, continues by forming civic 
and political associations, and culminates in a national, democratic identity.  
Each avenue exhibits unique strengths and weaknesses and its effectiveness is 
measured using eight criteria.  In democratization, national elites represent the 
most significant variable due to their power and influence.  Elites fall into two 
categories: self-oriented and servant-oriented.  Based on game theory analysis, 
transitioners favor the top-down approach, servant-oriented elites favor accepting 
democracy, and self-oriented elites favor rejecting democracy.  Analysis predicts 
that democratization will succeed whenever transitioners encounter sufficient 
servant-oriented elites (35%) to induce national elite support.  Where servant-
oriented elites are inadequate, transitioners must boost their influence, or offer 
incentives to obtain elite support.  Otherwise, attempts at democratization will 
likely fail. 
 vi
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I. THE IMPORTANCE AND DIFFICULTY OF 
DEMOCRATIZATION  
A. THE STRATEGY OF DEMOCRATIZATION 
Over the past eight years, the process of installing and promoting 
democratic regimes in foreign nations, or democratization, has become a 
cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy.  On March 16, 2006, President Bush issued a 
revised National Security Strategy stating that it is U.S. policy to “seek and 
support democratic movements” in hopes of “[creating] a world of democratic, 
well-governed states” (United States & President (2001- : Bush), 2006).  
According to this strategy, democracy is “viewed as a tool to end tyranny and 
fight terrorism, as the way to promote stability in troubled regions, and as a 
mechanism to increase prosperity in poor countries” (Epstein, Serafino, Miko, 
Library of Congress, & Congressional Research Service, 2007, p. 1).  The United 
States is currently working to execute this strategy of democratization.  Secretary 
of State Condoleezza Rice claims that democratization has become a priority 
because “that is the mission that President Bush has set for America in the 
world” (Epstein et al., 2007).   
A democratization strategy is not cheap. From September 2001 through 
the end of fiscal year 2007, the cost of democratization operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan has exceeded $604 billion.  Expenditures for  fiscal year 2008 and 
2009 are expected to be about $226 billion, and total spending for 2001-2017 is 
projected to amount to between $1.2 trillion and $1.7 trillion (Belasco, Library of 
Congress, & Congressional Research Service, 2008; Orszag, United States, & 
Congressional Budget Office, 2007).1  Moreover, these figures do not account for 
immeasurables such as the loss of human life or the impact on the international 
community.  In fiscal year 2008, the United States requested over $1.5 billion for 
                                            
1 Since democratization is the primary objective of U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, all 
operations within the two nations were included in calculating these costs. 
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democracy promotion activities, mostly through the Department of State (Epstein 
et al., 2007, p. 19).  On the other hand, the cost of failed democracies is also 
inestimably high.  The long-term expense of countering and stabilizing failed 
states can easily exceed even the highest democratization price tag.  The key to 
successfully spreading democracy lies in developing a more effective and more 
efficient approach to the democratization process.  Such an improvement can aid 
in the completion of U.S. foreign policy, reduce the cost of the policy, and help 
avoid a failed transition.   
B. OPTIMIZING THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS 
For decades, scholars have debated over the most effective approach to 
installing a democratic regime, and a consensus does not appear attainable in 
the near future.  Recent attempts at democratization have shown the process to 
be increasingly difficult and have left many questions unanswered.  Chief among 
them is the question: “How can one maximize the probability of instituting a 
stable, democratic government while minimizing intrastate violence and the 
possibility of internal collapse?” 
This discussion will attempt to answer that question, and it hypothesizes 
that the solution can be found by analyzing the partial conflict between 
transitioners (those installing democracy) and national elites (those that wield 
power at the national level).  First, transitioners must develop and sequence their 
approach to the democratization process to suit the scenario at hand.  Second, 
transitioners must consider the means and motivations of elites.  Finally, 
transitioners must analyze the partial conflict between these two parties in order 
to select the best course of action and predict the likely outcomes.  While the 
results of this discussion may not present a comprehensive solution, they will 
provide additional insight into the problem, bringing everyone closer to an 
optimized democratization process.   
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C. METHODOLOGY AND OVERVIEW 
Overall, this discussion will take an inductive approach, using a blend of 
qualitative and quantitative methods.  It will attempt to frame quantitatively the 
democratization process and the actions of national elites in order to analyze 
their interactions in a game of partial conflict.  The results of this analysis will 
point to new methods for optimizing the democratization process.  The following 
sections provide a brief overview of each chapter. 
Chapter II begins by developing criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of 
a newly installed democracy using methodologies similar to Freedom House.  It 
then utilizes the research of numerous respected scholars to piece together 
inductively two avenues to democratization.  Depending upon the unique 
circumstances of the target nation, each avenue exhibits distinctive strengths and 
weaknesses, all of which must be considered. 
Chapter III explores the basic motivations of national elites in an effort to 
predict their responses to the democratization process.  It continues by dividing 
elites into various categories based on the broad desires that motivate each 
group.  Lastly, the chapter leverages the research of psychologist Steven Reiss 
to develop generalized personality profiles that codify the more specific wants 
and desires of each type.  These desired profiles are then used to predict the 
actions of national elites. 
Chapter IV uses the findings from the previous two chapters to frame the 
democratization process as a game of partial conflict between transitioners and 
national elites.  It examines the possible results of each scenario, develops utility 
payouts for each outcome, and organizes these payouts into a payout matrix.  
Each utility payout represents the general satisfaction received by a player for a 
given outcome.  The chapter then analyzes this matrix to determine dominant 
strategies, likely outcomes, strategic moves, and optimal solutions.  Lastly, it 
repeats this analysis in a multi-party environment where multiple varieties of 
national elites are present simultaneously. 
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Chapter V examines the analysis from Chapter IV in an effort to 
extrapolate any generalized conclusions that may be applied to all 
democratization scenarios.  It also outlines areas that should be investigated for 
further research.  Hopefully, these findings can be examined and applied by the 
United States and help to bring about a smoother and swifter completion to its 
policy of global democratization.  
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II. METRICS AND AVENUES OF DEMOCRATIZATION 
According to Alain Touraine, a famous French sociologist, “the sovereignty 
of the people paves the way to democracy” (Touraine, 1997, p. 21).  But the word 
democracy has many meanings, and as history illustrates, not all democracies 
achieve equal success.  This chapter begins by developing a definition of the 
word democracy and identifying the traits exhibited by all democracies.  Next, it 
develops a list of metrics for evaluating a democracy and assigns numerical 
values to each criterion, based on its relative importance to the overall 
effectiveness of a democratic government.  Lastly, it leverages the works of other 
scholars to develop two avenues for installing a democratic regime in a target 
nation.  Chapter IV then pairs these avenues against the reactions of various 
national elite and evaluates the success and/or failure of democratization using 
the developed criteria. 
A. A DEFINITION OF DEMOCRACY 
Because there is considerable academic debate on the characteristics of a 
democracy, it is important first to establish a definition of the term.  The word 
democracy is derived from classical Greek, meaning rule (Xratos) by the people 
(demos) (Luckham, Goetz, & Kaldor, 2003, p. 15).  Political scientists Phillippe C. 
Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl pose the following definition: 
Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which 
rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by 
citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation 
of their elected representatives (1996, p. 50). 
To this definition, Samuel Huntington also adds: 
It also implies the existence of those civil and political freedoms to 
speak, publish, assemble, and organize that are necessary to 
political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns (1991, p. 
7).   
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Touraine provides a simpler definition stating that democracies provide 
“the freedom of the ruled to choose their rulers at regular intervals” (1997, p. 26).  
However, he further explains that rulers in a democracy must wield limited power 
and they must be representative of voters.  Additionally, these voters must regard 
themselves as citizens of a nation and the composition of the citizenry should 
remain continuous throughout the democratization process.  In other words, it 
should be clear to voters as to which political entity they belong (Rustow, 1969, 
p. 350-351). 
Norberto Bobbio provides one additional that should also be included in 
this discussion.  He claims that democracy must be defined by “a set of rules 
which establish who is authorized to take collective decisions and which 
procedures are to be used” (Bobbio & Bellamy, 1987, p. 24).  These procedures 
are usually recorded in the form of a constitution. 
In review, a democracy revolves around substantial voter participation in 
fair, regular, and competitive elections that provide citizens with the ability to 
select rulers and impose accountability upon them.  In addition, democratic 
institutions that provide the means for political debate, such as freedom to speak 
and assemble, must also be present.  Furthermore, these procedures should be 
delineated and protected in the form of a constitution.  While this definition has 
not achieved complete consensus in academic circles, it does agree with 
definitions posed by other notable scholars (Dahl, 1982; Diamond, 1999; Epstein, 
Serafino, Miko, Library of Congress, & Congressional Research Service, 2007; 
Luckham et al., 2003, p. 11; Snyder, 2000, p. 26; Higley & Gunther, 1992; Linz, 
1975, pp. 182-183). 
B. MEASURING DEMOCRACY 
Regular, competitive elections, and the democratic institutions required to 
facilitate these elections, represent the minimum standard for all democracies.  
However, not all democracies are created equal and some regimes surpass this 
basic level.  Other characteristics, such as the rule of law and minority rights, 
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contribute to the strength and effectiveness of a democracy, enabling a 
government to exceed these minimum levels.  These attributes may be present 
in varying degrees, and while their absence does not deny a government its 
democratic status, their presence does contribute to its overall success and 
stability as a democracy. 
Within the definition of a democracy, Larry Diamond identifies two 
subtypes: electoral and liberal.  These subtypes represent opposite ends of a 
continuum in which all defined democracies exist.  According to Diamond, an 
electoral democracy takes a minimalist view of democracy and is described as “a 
civilian, constitutional system in which the legislative and chief executive offices 
are filled through regular, competitive, multiparty elections with universal 
suffrage” (Diamond, 1999, p. 10).  Only the minimum levels of freedom are 
required in order for competition and participation to be meaningful.  On the other 
hand, a liberal democracy employs a “thick context of liberal institutions” (Snyder, 
2000, p. 317) to protect individual and group liberties and insulate civil society 
and private life from state control.  Under a liberal democracy, all citizens 
possess political and legal equality and the state, as well as its agents, are held 
accountable under the law (Diamond, 1999, pp. 10-12).  In short, an electoral 
democracy barely meets the proposed minimum definition while a liberal 
democracy represents a mature and consolidated democracy that is highly 
effective and incredibly stable. 
To properly evaluate the effectiveness of a democracy and its position on 
the electoral-liberal continuum, the regime must be measured against a proven 
set of quantitative grading criteria.  One possible fit is the criteria developed by 
Freedom House, a non-profit organization that promotes the spread of freedom, 
democracy, and the rule of law around the world through analysis, advocacy and 




Freedom is possible only in democratic political systems in which 
the governments are accountable to their own people, the rule of 
law prevails; and freedoms of expression, association, belief and 
respect for the rights of minorities and women are guaranteed 
(“About Us,” 2008). 
Because the prerequisites for freedom, as defined by Freedom House, are 
so closely correlated with the effectiveness of a democracy, the metrics used to 
evaluate one may also be applied to the other.  Diamond agrees with this 
approach, claiming Freedom House provides “the best available empirical 
indicator of liberal democracy” (Diamond, 1999, p. 12). 
Each year Freedom House conducts its “Freedom of the World” survey, 
and measures the performance of governments and the protection of freedom 
around the globe in seven sub-categories:  electoral process, political pluralism 
and participation, functioning of government, freedom of expression and belief, 
associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and 
individual rights (“Methodology,” 2008). These sub-categories also provide a 
framework for evaluating the effectiveness of a democracy.  The following 
sections represent a detailed look at each of these sub-categories. 
1.  Electoral Process 
This sub-category addresses the presence of elections and the fairness of 
the electoral framework.  In an effective democracy, the people must have the 
ability to select their nation’s leadership in an open and transparent forum.  
Elections should be independently monitored and executed in a timely manner, 
free from government pressure.  Voters must be free from intimidation and voter 
registration must be non-discriminatory.  If a nation’s chief national authority and 
national legislature are both selected through elections that are deemed free and 
fair, then the electoral process is deemed sufficient (“Methodology,” 2008; Dahl, 




respect the rights of the winner and accept defeat (Schmitter & Karl, 1996, p. 56).  
A government that fits the proposed definition of a democracy will score well in 
this sub-category.   
2. Political Pluralism and Participation 
Ideally, a democracy should strive for political pluralism and high levels of 
participation.  To start, the government must guarantee all citizens equal political 
and civil rights as well as the means to fully exercise these rights (Luckham, 
Goetz, & Kaldor, 2003, p. 19).  Citizens should be free to organize into political 
groupings of their choice, such as a political party, whose power will naturally 
ascend and decline over time.  Elections should always be competitive and the 
opposition should always have a realistic possibility of increasing its support or 
power.  Political choices should not be dominated by powerful groups, and 
minorities should have the same political rights and electoral opportunities as 
others (“Methodology,” 2008; Schmitter & Karl, 1996, p. 56; Touraine, 1997).  
3. Functioning of Government 
This sub-category addresses how the government functions between 
elections.  In an effective democracy, elected rulers are not simply figureheads:  
they wield real power and determine the actual policies of the nation’s 
government.  Rulers are not heavily influenced by the presence of criminal 
gangs, the military or foreign governments.  In addition, corruption levels should 
be relatively low and the government should enact laws and programs to 
maintain this low level.  Lastly, openness and transparency should be present at 
all levels of government between elections (“Methodology,” 2008; Schmitter & 
Karl, 1996, p. 55; Dahl, 1982, p. 11; Luckham et al., 2003, p. 19). 
4. Freedom of Expression and Belief 
The freedom of expression and belief is a pivotal concept in a democracy.  
Huntington claims that this democratic institution is absolutely necessary for the 
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proper execution of the electoral process because it facilitates political 
campaigning and educated voters (Huntington, 1991, p. 7).  A successful 
democracy should promote a free and independent media or other form of 
political expression.  Censorship should remain relatively low and any retribution 
from the government should be minimal.  Religious institutions should be allowed 
to exercise their faith, free from government intervention.  Open and free 
discussion should be a staple of society and the educational system should avoid 
any political indoctrination (“Methodology,” 2008; Dahl, 1982, p. 11; Luckham et 
al., 2003, p. 19). 
5. Associational and Organizational Rights 
This sub-category refers to the ability of groups to organize, meet, and 
operate without government intervention.  In an effective democracy, the 
government will allow organizations to assembly and demonstrate peacefully, 
without threat of retribution towards them or their supporters.  In addition, non-
government organizations are not subjected to excessive bureaucratic 
requirements or unreasonable economic restraints.  Lastly, citizens may bind 
together in the form of trade unions or peasant organizations or seek other 
means of collective bargaining (“Methodology,” 2008; Dahl, 1982, p. 11). 
6. Rule of Law 
Governments that excel in this sub-category possess an independent 
judiciary that is free of influence from other branches of government or outside 
sources.  The rule of law should prevail in civil and criminal matters and other 
members of the government adhere to judicial rulings.  Law enforcement should 
be under direct civilian control and police must adequately protect citizens while 
also acknowledging their individual rights.  When these rights are violated, the 
government must provide a means of redress.  Lastly, laws must be universally 
enforced on all segments of the population, to include rulers (“Methodology,” 
2008; Luckham et al., 2003, p. 19; Touraine, 1997). 
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7. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights 
This sub-category describes an individual’s ability to own property and 
make individual choices autonomous of the government.  In an effective 
democracy, few restrictions exist regarding foreign travel, residency, and 
employment.  Individuals may pursue a life of their choosing to include selecting 
both their marriage partners as well as the size of their families.  Citizens may 
own property and pursue private business interests without undue influence from 
political entities, security forces, or organized crime.  Most importantly, all citizens 
possess an equality of opportunity and an absence of economic exploitation, 
regardless of gender, ethnicity, religion, or economic status (“Methodology,” 
2008; Luckham et al., 2003, p. 19). 
C. QUANTIFYING A DEMOCRACY 
In order to quantify the criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of a 
democracy, each of these sub-categories must be assigned a numerical value 
that corresponds to its relative importance.  According to Freedom House, each 
of these characteristics hold nearly equal importance and should therefore 
receive the same number of points (“Methodology,” 2008).  In accordance with 
this argument, five points will be assigned to each criterion and the resulting 
quantitative criteria, depicted in Figure 1, will be used in Chapter IV to evaluate 








Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights 5  
Figure 1.   Quantified Criteria for Evaluating a Successful Democracy 
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D. TWO AVENUES OF DEMOCRATIZATION 
In The Third Wave, Samuel Huntington defines democratization as “the 
end of the nondemocratic regime, the inauguration of the democratic regime, and 
then the consolidation of the democratic system” (1991, p. 9).  In this discussion, 
it is assumed that the nondemocratic regime is no longer present and the target 
nation is beginning the inauguration process.  The goal of the following avenues 
is to navigate this middle phase and set the stage for successful consolidation.  
The long and tedious process of democratic consolidation will fall outside the 
scope of this discussion. 
When considering how to approach the democratization process, two 
avenues seem apparent.  The first is to begin inauguration at the apex of the 
governmental structure, eventually working down through the regional and local 
levels of government.  The other solution is to start inauguration at the local level, 
slowly building the government, culminating at the national level.  At this point, it 
is important to note that these approaches characterize ideal progressions of 
democratization and may not be realistically attainable.  Constraints of time and 
resources often blur and complicate the democratization process.  However, this 
discussion will remain focused on the ideal in order to provide a consistent 
baseline from which to compare the two avenues.  Both exhibit distinctive 
strengths and weaknesses, and both should be examined.  
1. The First Step of Democratization 
The first and most important step in any democratization process, 
regardless of the approach, is to provide a secure environment.  Democracy 
cannot survive where anarchy thrives.  Jack Snyder asserts that citizens expect 
states to provide them with security and promote their economic prosperity 
(Brown, 1993, p. 8).  When the government is too weak to provide these 
services, the people will look elsewhere for support, effectively stripping the 
government of its power and legitimacy.  Larry Diamond once stated, “If you don’t 
have a state, you can’t have a democratic state” (Lecture at Naval Postgraduate 
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School, Monterey, CA, Oct 30, 2007).  This point further emphasizes that security 
must be the top priority when democratizing a nation; after a secure environment 
has been established, a fruitful democracy can begin to take root.   
2. Building Democracy at the State Level 
In Man, the State, and War, international relations scholar Kenneth Waltz 
claims that “man’s behavior...is, according to Rousseau, in great part a product of 
the society in which he lives.  And society, he avers, is inseparable from political 
organization” (Waltz, 1954, p. 5).  Continuing on, Waltz states, “Rousseau, like 
Plato, believes that a bad polity makes men bad, and a good polity, makes them 
good” (Waltz, 1954, p. 5).  While his book is primarily about preventing interstate 
war, its lessons may be applied to other topics.  According to these statements, 
man could be viewed as a product of his environment.  Following this logic, 
another method for inaugurating a democratic state would be to establish an 
environment of democracy that will influence and develop its citizens.  By 
working at the national level to promote a national identity and develop liberal 
institutions, transitioners can cultivate a civic form of nationalism, guarantee 
rights at the individual level, and create an environment ripe for democracy 
(Snyder, 2000, p. 40).  Once this is accomplished, it should propagate down 
through the lower levels and instill itself within individuals; this is a top-down 
approach.  
The first step in creating a nation’s civic identity is to build a strong middle 
class (Snyder, 2000, p. 321) to bridge the gap between elites and the working 
class.  While this will require significant time and economic development, it plays 
a key role in defending civil rights and civic institutions.  A strong middle class, 
acting as a bridge, also helps unify the populace and prevent civic identity from 
either fracturing or being hijacked by national elites.  This is paramount before 
taking the next step of democratization. 
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Once a strong middle class arises, the next step is to develop a “thick 
version of liberalism” (Snyder, 2000, pp. 316-317) through the development of 
free markets, free speech, individual rights and other democratic institutions.  
These institutions ensure “the rights and freedoms of all citizens are equally 
protected under the law,” (Luckham, Goetz, & Kaldor, 2003), p. 18).  They 
promote mass participation, facilitate open and fair competition for power, ensure 
the accountability of the government, and fight tyranny of the majority (Luckham 
et al., 2003), pp. 15-16).  In addition, developing liberalism can “ward off 
aggressively nationalist outcomes,” decrease intrastate violence, and limit the 
effectiveness of hostile elites (Snyder, 2000, p. 320).  In short, this web acts as a 
safety net to ease the democratic transition and cultivate civic nationalism. 
Other strands in the thick web include civic associations that prepare 
individuals for the next step in the democratic process.  They unite men over 
minor, communal matters and enable them to develop the skills required to 
manage larger, political matters.  They serve to “channel mass political 
participation into liberal directions” (Snyder, 2000, pp. 316-317), provide a forum 
for rational discussion and the settlement of conflict, and promote citizen 
participation (Luckham et al., 2003).  According to de Tocqueville, “civil 
associations, therefore, pave the way for political associations” and political 
associations pave the way for open elections (2003, p. 604). 
Once civic and political associations have surpassed other forms of 
identity, it is time to organize elections.  But elections should be approached 
cautiously because they simultaneously provide the greatest opportunity for 
success and the foremost chance for failure.  If elections receive broad 
participation, citizens vote along civic lines, and losers accept the results, then 
the nation achieves a grand success and embarks on the path to becoming what 
Snyder and others calls a mature or consolidated democracy (Snyder, 2000, p. 
382 ).   
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However, if political and civic associations do not fully develop or if a 
nation’s civic identity is weak, then elections may be doomed from the start.  
Ethnic associations or hostile elites could commandeer the democratic process, 
or influential leaders could encourage an election boycott; either would result in a 
non-representative government.  Furthermore, ethnic groups could be mobilized 
as powerful voting blocks by those seeking election (Eller, 1999, p. 368; Snyder, 
2000).  If political parties form along ethnic lines, an election could degenerate to 
a mere census, introducing ethnic conflict into the nation’s government and 
drawing attention away from civic issues.  Once a non-representative 
government of any kind is entrenched in power, it is difficult to overcome (Higley 
& Gunther, 1992; Manning, 2007).  It will be long and uphill battle to reacquire the 
nation’s civic identity. 
3. Building Democracy at the Individual Level 
Waltz also claims that “the most important causes of political 
arrangements and acts are found in the nature and behavior of man” (Waltz, 
1954, p. 42).  However, man’s nature is dynamic and his behavior is subject to 
influence.  Waltz recognizes this and states that it is possible to institute change 
within a society by changing the attitudes of the individuals through education, 
religious-moral appeals, and other forms of behavioral science (Waltz, 1954).  If 
Waltz is correct, then one approach for establishing a democracy is to instill 
democratic ideals within its individual citizens.  Developing these ideals at the 
most basic level will enable the democratization of the individual, then the 
community, then the province, and finally the nation; it is a bottom-up approach. 
The first step is to promote equality and trust at the individual level through 
the building of social capital: “a set of informal values or norms ... that permits [a 
group] to cooperate with one another” (Fukuyama, 2000, p. 98).  Equality and 
trust are the cornerstones of a successful democracy and pivotal to the success 
of a society (de Tocqueville, Bevan, Kramnick, de Tocqueville, & de Tocqueville, 
2003; Fukuyama, 2000, p. 98).  Building social capital promotes the development 
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of democratic ideals by demonstrating the necessity for individuals to work 
together for the betterment of the community.  During the democratization 
process, newly independent citizens regrettably may become “drunk with their 
new power” (de Tocqueville et al., 2003, p. 590).  Social capital can serve as an 
antidote.  It helps temper the spread of egoism, and upholds the protection of 
civil liberties.  Most importantly, the democratization process is based on 
promoting conflict among factions and resolving this conflict through peaceful 
negotiation and compromise (Rustow, 1969).  Social capital can serve as the 
currency to fund the path to compromise.  
Next comes the formation of civic associations, organized around civic 
issues.  These associations provide forums where citizens develop their abilities 
to communicate, negotiate, and navigate towards a common goal.  Democratic 
ideals are reinforced and developed as individuals come together as organized 
citizens, not as fractured individuals.  In 1841, de Tocqueville observed civic 
associations within the U.S. stating: “each citizen learned the skills of uniting with 
his fellows to defend his freedom at a time when he is becoming individually 
weaker and consequently less capable of preserving his freedom in isolation” (de 
Tocqueville et al., 2003, p. 595).  Eventually, citizens will apply their newly 
refined skills to confront political issues, leading to the formation of political 
associations. 
Political associations, founded upon political issues, supply the necessary 
framework for broad participation in government and the management of regular, 
open elections.  These associations allow the nation to achieve the mass 
participation required for a democracy.  Once a few elections have passed, 
democracy becomes “the only game in town” (Snyder, 2000, p. 27).  Elections 
are viewed as the legitimate method to attain power and losers accept the 
results, choosing to wait for the next election to pursue power (Przeworski, 
1991).  At this point, the nation has passed enough tests to be considered a 
successful democratic state and is well on its way to successful consolidation 
(Snyder, 2000). 
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Because of its focus on the individual, this approach may provide the best 
chance of long-term success; but it does pose other challenges.  Developing 
social capital is a long and laborious process.  Social capital is “a nebulous 
concept that is difficult if not impossible to measure” (Fukuyama, 2000, p. 101) 
and without applicable metrics, demonstrating progress or assessing an accurate 
timetable would be problematic.  For this reason, this avenue is not ideal for 
situations where the democratization process must move rapidly or demonstrate 
measurable progress.  
E. APPLICATION OF THE AVENUES 
These two avenues, hereafter referred to as top-down and bottom-up, are 
two of the most common approaches to democratization and portray this 
discussion’s preferred approaches.  However, they should not be viewed as 
universal solutions to the democratization problem.  Rustow claims that “there 
may be many roads to democracy” (1969, p. 345) and these avenues merely 
represent two such roads; many others are possible. 
Each of these avenues is uniquely different from its partner and each 
exhibits unique strengths and weaknesses.  One is faster while the other is more 
thorough; one focuses on the people while the other focuses on the institutions. 
Depending on the scenario present in the target nation, one avenue may be 
more appropriate or more successful than the other.  Also of note, the 
democratization process does not take place in a vacuum; there is significant 
interplay between transitioners, national elite, and citizens.  Different avenues 
elicit different responses from each faction, which in turn affect the overall course 
and success of democratization.   
Now that two main avenues for democratization have been identified, the 
discussion can move forward to other components.  The next chapter will 
analyze the group personalities of national elite in an attempt to predict their 
responses to various democratization avenues.  Chapter IV will then apply game 
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theory to analyze the interplay between transitioners and national elite and 
determine the likely outcome of each of the two avenues when confronted with 
two types of national elite.   
 19
III. MOTIVATIONS AND PROFILES OF NATIONAL ELITES 
Dating back to the time of Plato, scholars have always believed that man 
plays a role in shaping history and that those placed in positions of leadership 
have an even greater part to play (Plato & Jowett, 1941).  Exactly how great a 
role is variable.  This chapter begins by discussing the role a nation’s elite play in 
the democratization process and continues by examining the different desires 
that are commonly present within national elites.  Next, it arranges these desires 
into personality profiles that describe different varieties of national elites.  Upon 
completion, each profile will possess quantifiable strivings that can then be used 
to calculate the utility payouts received by elites under various circumstances.  
These payouts will enable a better understanding of the actions taken by national 
elites and will lead to more accurate predictions of elite behavior.  The findings 
can consequently be applied to the partial conflict analysis conducted in Chapter 
IV. 
A. THE ROLE OF NATIONAL ELITES 
At this point, it is important to establish a definition for national elites.  
Higley, Burton and Gunther pose this statement: 
We define elites as persons who are able, by virtue of their 
strategic positions in powerful organizations, to affect national 
political outcomes regularly and substantially.  Elites are the 
principle decision makers in the largest or most resource rich 
political, governmental, economic, military, professional, 
communications, and cultural organizations and movements in a 
society (Higley & Gunther, 1992, p. 8). 
Eller provides a more thorough depiction, describing them as “an elite 
class availing [themselves] of the opportunities that education, economy, and 
politics presented” who then “take the reins of power” during a transition (Eller, 
1999, p. 35).  They control large caches of material resources, educational 
knowledge, and community influence and can mobilize a group to action.  In 
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effect, they control “the circuitry and infrastructure of ethnicity and nationalism” 
and can “mount a successful movement, peaceful or violent, in the group’s 
cause” (Eller, 1999, p. 45). 
The political behavior of national elites is affected by many variables, 
including: input from the current situation; the cultural, sociopolitical, and familial 
environment; and the personality of the individual (Post & George, 2004, p. 13).  
According to psychiatrist and political personality profiler Jerald Post, a leader’s 
personality has often been overlooked in the past.  Instead, leaders were 
depicted as a “rational decision maker, devoid of personality, with little attention 
paid to effects, drives, and unresolved conflicts” (Post & George, 2004, p. 14).  
However, one study has shown that the effects of an individual’s personality are 
amplified when the environment is in transition, especially if the individual is in a 
position of influence (Greenstein, 1987).  These two observations perfectly 
describe a nation’s elites as they participate in the democratization process.  
Therefore, it can be argued that the personality of elites play a significant factor 
in the democratization process.   
Several agree that elites constitute one of the most critical variables in the 
democratization process; their support can mean the difference between a 
smooth transition to a successful democracy and a downward spiral towards a 
failed state (Diamond, 1999, p. 66; Higley & Burton, 1989; Higley & Gunther, 
1992; Huntington, 1991).  Specifically, Diamond states that elites are 
“indespensible to bringing about democracy and making it work” (Diamond, 1999, 
p. 218).  If elites maintain an adaptable stance and are willing to negotiate the 
process, a peaceful transition is likely to follow.  On the other hand, if national 
elites are unwilling to compromise and instead choose to mobilize the populace 
in opposition to democratization, intrastate violence or failed states are probable 
outcomes. 
If transitioners can find a way to sway elites and harness their influence in 
support of the transition, it will enable them to maximize the probability of 
installing a stable, democratic government and minimize the probability of 
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intrastate violence and internal collapse.  But how do outside actors sway 
national elites?  In order to answer this question, a different question must first be 
posed: “What motivates national elites?”  
B. BASIC MOTIVATIONS OF NATIONAL ELITES 
Simply put, motivations constitute those basic desires and values that 
influence an individual and govern his or her behavior.  They are what enable a 
person to assign utility to possible outcomes and the foundation for making a 
rational choices between conflicting alternatives (Reiss, 2000).  Motivations may 
also be identified as desires or strivings; in this discussion these three terms will 
be used synonymously.  An individual’s motivations will form the core of their 
decision-making and will ultimately dictate their behavior.  To identify and 
quantify these strivings, it is beneficial to employ a tool from the realm of 
psychology called sensitivity theory.   
Sensitivity theory states that “people behave as if they are trying to 
maximize their experiences of 15 intrinsically valued joys” (Havercamp & Reiss, 
2003, p. 124).  These 15 basic desires apply to all human beings as well as 
many of our closer animal relatives.  They are not good or bad, better or worse, 
moral or wicked; they are simply neutral.  Figure 2 shows Reiss’s 15 basic 
desires and gives a brief explanation of each (Havercamp & Reiss, 2003, p. 124; 

















Tranquility Desire to avoid anxiety, fear, and pain (desire for emotional calm)  
Figure 2.   Reiss’s 15 Basic Desires 
Each individual possesses a unique mix of these desires, which is the 
result of family genetics and life experiences (Reiss, 2000).  This mix is called a 
desire profile, or Reiss profile, and represents a person’s “unique prioritization of 
the 15 strivings” (Havercamp & Reiss, 2003).  When there is a conflict between 
two motivations, the higher-priority desire takes precedence (Reiss, 2000).  In a 
previous study, Havercamp and Reiss demonstrated that individuals serving in 
similar positions possess similar desire profiles (2003).  Based on these 
conclusions, it should be possible to develop a set of generalized desire profiles 
that encompass different types of national elites.  When applying these profiles, it 
is important to view them as “a set of premises and beliefs..., and not as a set of 
rules and recipes to be applied mechanically” (George, 1996, p. 375).  If viewed 
with the proper perspective, these profiles can function as a means to predict 
general elite behavior.  
The 15 basic desires are not equally valued by all elites with some 
carrying more importance than others.  Studies have shown that those 
motivations that are unusually strong will have a greater impact on an individual’s 
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behavior (Havercamp & Reiss, 2003).  Those valued as “very important” will have 
a positive effect, as the individual steers towards these desires (Reiss, 2000).  
Therefore, focusing on only the stronger desires will both simplify the process as 
well as generalize the profile.  This will frame a problem that is small enough to 
solve, as well as findings that are broad enough to serve a wide scope.  The 
following sections represent a short discussion of the basic desires that have the 
most influence on the behavior of national elites.   
1. Power 
Power is the most significant and most frequent desire in a profile of 
national elites.  Reiss claims that the craving for power is often satisfied in one of 
two ways:  achievement or leadership.  Achievements may be large or small; for 
example, they can range from earning entry into an esteemed profession to 
winning a local bowling league.  These accomplishments place the individual in a 
position of influence, label them as the envy of their peers, and briefly satiate the 
individual’s appetite for power.  On the other hand, leadership places an 
individual in a position of influence and provides them with the ability to affect 
others.  Supplied with this new authority, their desire is temporarily satisfied 
(Reiss, 2000).  
By definition, national elites often boast many achievements and actively 
seek leadership roles within their society.  Eller states that they “take the reins of 
power” in a transition (Eller, 1999, p. 35) and possess the ability to “mount a 
successful movement, peaceful or violent, in the group’s cause” (Eller, 1999, p. 
45).  Elites actively seek opportunities to exert influence over the local populace 
and therefore it seems reasonable to assume that all national elites would rate 
power as “very important.” 
2. Status 
Most elites strive to acquire and maintain status.  This desire can be 
characterized as longing for prestige, attempting to “move up” in the world, and 
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hoping to “become somebody” and impress one’s peers.  A person with this 
desire would choose a Mercedes-Benz over a Crown Victoria simply because it 
implies a higher status.  In addition, reputations are very important to someone 
who is motivated by status (Reiss, 2000, pp. 62-64).   
National elites typically live comfortable lifestyles.  They are members of a 
higher class and are considered local or regional celebrities.  Most are cognizant 
of their public image.  Their designation as a national elite, by definition, grants 
them a high status.  If living in this manner did not please them, sensitivity theory 
hypothesizes that they would eventually retreat to a different lifestyle where they 
would be more comfortable, resigning their high status (Reiss, 2000).  By 
choosing to maintain their position of authority, they reveal that status is 
something they want.  As a result, it earns a rating of “very important.” 
3. Acceptance 
Acceptance is another quality that drives national elites.  This striving is 
defined as “the desire for inclusion” and “motivates people to avoid rejection and 
criticism.”  Those who rate acceptance as “very important” often consider 
themselves unworthy and are constantly seeking praise and adulation.  They 
often surround themselves with those who will placate them and acquiesce with 
their opinions (Reiss, 2000, pp. 43-44).   
National elites are often described as narcissistic and many, at least 
superficially, appear to exude self-confidence.  While elites often give the 
impression of brilliance, closer examination often reveals that an elite resides 
“within a glass bubble” and “actually has feelings of inferiority and thus is over-
dependent on the approving attention of other people” (Volkan, 1980, p. 132).  
Post describes these individuals as “mirror-hungry leaders” who “require a 
continuing flow of admiration from their audiences to nourish their famished 
selves” (2004, p. 191).  These “mirror-hungry leaders” would consider 
acceptance to be “very important.”   
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4. Honor 
Honor is another striving that must be considered for the elite profiles.  
This motivation is defined as “the desire to be loyal to one’s parents and, by 
extension, to one’s [background].”  Reiss further states that “people with a strong 
desire for honor tend to place a high value on character, religion, ethnic 
traditions, and patriotism.”  They are often motivated by “a strong sense of duty 
that takes precedence over everything else” (Reiss, 2000, pp. 52-53).  While 
honor is not universal to all national elites, it does apply to sizeable factions such 
as tribal leaders, religious elders, and nationalistic figures.  For elites that exhibit 
a strong duty towards their country, their ethnic origin, or their religious 
background, honor is “very important” and must be included in their profile.  
5. Idealism 
The pursuit of idealism also shapes the behavior of many national elites.  
This desire “motivates people to get involved and contribute to the betterment of 
human kind” (Reiss, 2000, p. 55).  Elites that desire idealism will place a high 
value on fairness, social justice and are more likely to support democratization.  
By definition, all national elites are heavily involved in their society, but not all 
elites exercise their influence to make the world a better place.  Those who toil 
for social or humanitarian causes and contribute to those in need would rate 
idealism as “very important.” 
6. Omitted Desires 
In developing this set of desire profiles, the majority of the motivations did 
not strongly influence elites.  This is not unusual as Reiss claims that most 
people are heavily influenced by 3-10 desires and national elites follow this 
pattern.  After reviewing Eller’s description of national elites and Post’s collection 
of psychological profiles, the remaining ten desires were eliminated (curiosity, 
independence, social contact, vengeance, physical exercise, romance, family, 
order, eating, and tranquility) because they do not appear to significantly impact 
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elites.  For example, while most elites actively pursue and thrive in social 
environments, the motivation of social contact does not drive them because 
these situations usually serve as means to an end.  Elites often seek out social 
gatherings because it increases their constituency (satisfying the desire for 
power), furthers a social movement they support (desire for idealism), or fuels 
their celebrity status (desire for status or acceptance).  Rarely do national elites 
congregate with common people because they view it as “fun.”  
C. DESIRE PROFILES OF NATIONAL ELITES 
Elites can be divided into two general categories: self-oriented and 
service-oriented. Loosely based on two accepted leader personality types, one 
group acts in a manner that will benefit themselves while the other group strives 
to benefit others (Post & George, 2004, p. 106).  These two groups comprise the 
most common personalities found among leaders and provide an excellent 
foundation for studying national elites and their impact on the democratization 
process. 
1. Self-oriented National Elites 
The conscience of self-oriented national elite are dominated by self-
interest.  They are driven by ambition and are often preoccupied with visions of 
unlimited success, power, and brilliance.  These elites emanate a grandiose aura 
of self-importance and place a high priority on maintaining and enhancing their 
career and their public image.  From an outsider’s view, they often appear to be 
principled and scrupulous, using this deception to their advantage (Post & 
George, 2004).  Self-oriented elites commonly manipulate and exploit others to 
accomplish their own ends.  Ironically, despite a façade of grandeur, these elites 
often possess fragile self-esteem and lack empathy.  Craving adulation, they 
often surround themselves with sycophants, placing themselves out of touch with 
reality (Post & George, 2004; American Psychiatric Association & American 
Psychiatric Association. Task Force on DSM-IV, 1994, pp. 658-670).   
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After observing the lives of self-oriented elites, it is apparent which 
strivings dominate their desire profiles.  The behavior of these elites is focused 
around the pursuit of three desires: power, acceptance, and status.  When 
combined, these basic motivations form the profile of an individual whose 
behavior focuses on self-interest and who displays narcissistic tendencies.  The 
following description, provided by Jerrold Post, demonstrates how elite behavior 
can show evidence of multiple desires.  In this case, the unique blend of desires 
exhibited by Kim Jong Il categorizes him as a self-oriented elite. 
Kim Jong Il, the chair of the North Korean National Defense Commission, 
has built his life around power, acceptance, and status.  He is the alleged source 
of multiple betrayals and even a few deaths (Post & George, 2004, pp. 244-246).  
His thirst for power trumps all as he will “use whatever aggression is necessary, 
without qualm or conscience, be it to eliminate an individual or to strike out at a 
particular group” (Post & George, 2004, p. 255).  Agitated by his short stature 
and desiring the acceptance of others, Kim reportedly wears custom-built 
platform shoes and employs a flamboyant hairstyle to help boost his height (Post 
& George, 2004, p. 247).  His inner circle is filled with sycophants and he often 
employs fear and humiliation to exert control over them and maintain their loyalty.  
Motivated by status, he spends between $650,000 and $800,000 each year on 
French cognac, 770 times the average income of a North Korean worker.  His 
seven-story pleasure palace in Pyongyang is supplied with only the finest 
luxuries and is the site of lavish nightly parties (Post & George, 2004, p. 249).  
Meanwhile, when famines strike the country, he often denies food and aid to 
those in need and herds thousands into camps where the death toll skyrockets 
(Post & George, 2004, p. 249). 
2. Service-oriented National Elites 
Service-oriented national elites are governed by a strong sense of duty 
and morality.  Their primary focus is to do the right thing and they rely primarily 
on their principles for guidance.  The source of these principles may vary from 
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person to person; some will be heavily devoted to their nation, others will be loyal 
to their ethnicity, and still others will abide by their instilled morals.  Many of these 
individuals pursue positions as a national elite because it enables them to serve 
something greater than themselves.  Unlike self-oriented elites, they do not 
require adulation and often choose the unpopular road because they feel it is the 
right course.  However, the pursuit of power and influence remain important 
because these are the tools of their trade and allow them to enact change upon 
their society. 
Like self-oriented elites, service-oriented elites are also described by 
desire profile.  Based on their observed behavior, these elites place a strong 
emphasis on the basic motivations of honor, idealism, and power.  Collectively, 
these desires portray an individual who places the common good above their 
own ambitions.  They view their position more as a responsibility and less as a 
privilege.  As an elite, they have been given the opportunity to make their world a 
better place and they strive to uphold that responsibility.   
Charles de Gaulle, the leader of France from 1958-1968, exhibits these 
characteristics.  As a boy, he was so engulfed by nationalism (desire for honor), 
and he refused to learn English.  Often accused of being aloof, he usually stood 
alone, choosing not to interact with others.  De Gaulle viewed them merely as 
ordinary human beings whereas he bore the responsibilities of France.  As an 
elite, he was responsible to the French citizens and it was his duty to guide their 
nation to greatness.  In 1958, he agreed to assume the role of dictator to resolve 
a revolt and restore peace to the country.  Although he was pleased with this 
position of power, it did not consume him.  Ten years later, he chose to sacrifice 
his position as dictator to appease another revolt.  Although it cost him both 
power and the popularity of his nation, he stepped aside for the betterment of his 
country (Post & George, 2004, pp. 46-49). 
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D. QUANTIFYING THE DESIRE PROFILES OF NATIONAL ELITES 
According to sensitivity theory, a person’s behavior is the direct result of 
attempts to maximize those desires that are valued by that individual.  The more 
value a person places on a desire, the greater the impact on that person’s 
behavior.  The previous section divided national elites into two sub-categories: 
self-oriented and servant-oriented.  A desire profile was developed for each by 
highlighting the top three motivations of each group.  Now the final step is to 
assign cardinal utility values to each desire in order to discern the payouts for 
various decisions. 
 To begin, each profile is assigned a pool of 30 utility points to be divided 
among the three desires, according to their relative importance.  Beginning with 
the first profile, self-oriented national elites strongly exhibit the desire for power 
as many of Post’s profiles illustrate (Post & George, 2004).  Because of its high 
value to self-oriented elites, power will receive half, or fifteen, of the utility points 
from the pool.  The desire for acceptance is strong enough to affect elite behavior 
most of the time and, as a result, will be assigned ten points.  The desire for 
status is another driving force and it will receive the remaining five points.  This 





Status 5  
Figure 3.   Quantified Desire Profile of Self-oriented National Elites 
With servant-oriented national elites, the desires for honor and idealism 
are displayed most often.  The dominant desire depended on the values and 
principles of the individual elite.  To symbolize their nearly equal importance to 
servant-oriented national elites, these two desires are each assigned twelve 
 30
points.  The remaining six points are assigned to the desire for power, which is 
viewed by these elites primarily as a means to achieve other goals.  It is still a 
significant desire, but not as important as the other two.  The figure below shows 
the desire profile for service-oriented national elites as well as the utility values 




Power 6  
Figure 4.   Quantified Desire Profile of Servant-oriented National Elites 
Armed with quantifiable desire profiles, the next chapter will apply these 
profiles to elites confronted by the democratization process.   Representative of 
the values of national elites, the desire models will be used to predict the 
subsequent reactions of national elites as they are propelled into a transition to 
democracy. 
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IV. A PARTIAL CONFLICT ANALYSIS OF THE 
DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS  
The democratization process can be modeled as a game played between 
two players.  On one side of the board are the transitioners, who are attempting 
to inaugurate democracy in the target nation. On the other side are the national 
elites, who wield power and influence within the target nation.  Each side enters 
the game with unique objectives, which signify the results they hope to achieve at 
the end of this game.  Both sides have moves available to them, which represent 
the different courses of action they may take to affect the outcome of 
democratization.  As in all games, there is inherent conflict between these two 
players.  In this instance, it is a game of partial conflict, as a gain or loss by one 
player does not guarantee the reverse for the other player; it is not a zero-sum 
game.  In some instances, both sides win, and in others, both sides lose.   
Analyzing the player relationships within this game will provide insight into 
the democratization process and help to identify causal relationships, likely 
outcomes, and optimal solutions.  This chapter will conduct that analysis.  First, it 
will identify the players and their primary objectives.  Next, it will apply the 
findings from Chapter II and Chapter III to develop an interval utility scale that 
measures the satisfaction gained by each player throughout the game.  Then, it 
will develop a payout matrix by pitting different courses of action against each 
other, and determining how each player’s objectives are satisfied by the various 
outcomes.  Lastly, it will analyze the payout matrix to determine each side’s 
optimal strategy, analyze the prospects of strategic moves or side payments, and 
ascertain the probable outcome of the democratization process.  To finish, it will 
then apply these same methodologies to a multi-party environment where 
multiple varieties of national elite are present.  While this particular analysis is 




framework is open to further expansion; with proper research, utility values may 
be tailored to provide a more in-depth and accurate analysis of a specific 
situation.  
A. THE PLAYERS 
As in any game, there are multiple players.  In the democratization 
process, two are primary: the transitioners and the national elites.  In this 
discussion, all players are assumed to be rational, meaning that they make 
choices according to what provides the greatest utility and hence the most 
satisfaction for that individual player.  The following sections examine the 
objectives and choices available for each of the players. 
1. Transitioners 
Transitioners represent the group attempting to inaugurate democracy in 
the target nation.  In recent cases, transitioners have not been native to the 
target nation; examples include U.S. efforts to democratize Iraq, NATO-led 
efforts in Afghanistan and Bosnia, and UN initiatives in Namibia in 1989, 
Cambodia in 1993, and East Timor in 1999.  In general, a blend of idealistic and 
realistic values, which are codified in the following two objectives, motivate 
transitioners. 
1) (35 pts) Install a successful, liberal democracy as outlined in Chapter II. 
2) (15 pts) Maintain low levels of violence in the transitioning nation 
Since democratization is the overall goal, transitioners’ primary objective is 
to install a successful, liberal democracy.  The more effective the installed 
government, the more satisfaction transitioners receive.  Therefore, the criteria 
developed in Chapter II that measures the effectiveness of a democratic regime 
can also be applied to measure the satisfaction of transitioners. 
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Maintaining low levels of violence is the second objective of transitioners 
because security is a prerequisite for any successful democracy (Lecture at 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, Oct 30, 2007).  Not only does 
violence decrease the chances of a successful democratic transition, it also 
increases the cost, in both materials and human capital, of the transition and 
lengthens the time required.  Violence also degrades stability and damages the 
transitioner’s credibility in the nation and in the world.  All of these items 
decrease the satisfaction gained by transitioners.  The absence of violence 
lowers costs, hastens benefits, and boosts the reputations of all involved.  
However, while security is highly influential in the outcome, it does not represent 
the primary objective of transitioners and therefore is only assigned 15 utility 
points. 
As discussed in Chapter II, transitioners have two main avenues when 
democratizing a nation.  They can instill democracy within the individual, building 
upwards to the national level, or they can install democracy in the nation, 
permeating down to the individual.  Either avenue represents a viable course of 
action and the decision as to which path to take represents a “move.” 
2. National Elites 
In Chapter III, national elites are defined as those that maintain power and 
influence within a nation, especially as it transitions to a democratic regime (Eller, 
1999; Higley & Gunther, 1992).  Elites’ decision rationales are often dominated 
by their personal desire profiles, which were examined at length in Chapter III 
(Post & George, 2004; Reiss, 2000).  This chapter also determined that national 
elites could be divided into two categories: self-oriented and servant-oriented.  
These two categories have different desire profiles and naturally possess 




Self-oriented elites draw satisfaction by achieving the following objectives:  
1)  (15 pts) Maintain or increase personal power 
2)  (10 pts) Maintain or increase acceptance by the populace 
3)  (5 pts) Maintain or increase personal status 
Self-oriented elites are dominated by self-interest.  As described in 
Chapter III, they exhibit the desire for power and continually strive to maintain or 
increase their power.  In addition, they place a high priority on acceptance and 
gain satisfaction when they are loved and adored by the populace.  Lastly, self-
oriented elites also strive to advance their personal status.  The point values 
assigned to each objective are drawn directly from the desire profiles developed 
in Chapter III. 
Servant-oriented elites draw satisfaction from attaining these objectives:  
1)  (12 pts) Maintain and promote honorable behavior 
2)  (12 pts) Maintain and promote idealistic beliefs 
3)  (6 pts) Maintain or increase personal power 
Servant-oriented national elites are guided by a sense of duty and 
morality.  As illustrated in Chapter III, these elites exhibit honorable tendencies 
and continually strive to fulfill their duties and obligations.  In addition, they place 
a high value on ideals such as fairness and social justice.  Servant-oriented 
elites, like self-oriented elites, are also interested in expanding their power, 
although it is viewed as relatively less important.  As with self-oriented elites, 
these point values are drawn directly from the desire profiles in the previous 
chpater.   
All national elites, regardless of which desire profile they follow, have two 
possible reactions to the democratization process.  They can either accept 
democratization, and harness their influence to ease the transition, or they can 
reject democracy, and mobilize the populace against it.  The decision as to 
whether to accept or mobilize represents a “move.” 
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B. THE PAYOUTS 
When various courses of action are matched against one another, it 
results in four scenarios with four possible outcomes.  To properly determine the 
results, these outcomes first must be studied.  Once that is accomplished, focus 
may be shifted to the payouts received, as different outcomes will provide 
different levels of satisfaction for each party.  Using the aforementioned 
objectives to examine each outcome will create a set of payouts that signify the 
general satisfaction gained by each player in each outcome.   
1. The Four Scenarios and Their Outcomes 
In the first possible scenario, transitioners install democracy using a top-
down approach while national elites accept democracy and use their power and 
influence to ease the transition.  Transitioners attempt to build the middle class 
through economic development, enabling elites to benefit materially from the 
economic growth.  Free markets, free speech, and individual rights are instituted, 
and the presence of social justice increases dramatically.  The support and 
backing of elites further improves the effectiveness of these institutions.  This not 
only creates an open competition for power and decreases the propensity for 
violence, but also breaks the power monopoly once held by national elites.  
Because of these developments, transitioners are able to cultivate a civic form of 
nationalism, built on civic associations.  These associations unite citizens over 
civic matters and train them in political matters.  Elections soon follow, likely 
resulting in a representative government where elites have a fair chance to attain 
power (Snyder, 2000). 
In the second possible scenario, transitioners again take a top-down 
approach, but national elites reject democracy.  Instead, they prefer to exercise 
their power and influence in mobilizing the populace against the transition.  As in 
the previous scenario, transitioners begin by promoting economic development to 
develop the middle class, while elites look for ways to profit.  Transitioners 
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continue democratization by instituting free markets, free speech, and individual 
rights.  Elites continue mobilizing, but the presence of democratic institutions and 
the resulting open competition for power limits their effectiveness.  Transitioners’ 
attempts to cultivate a civic form of nationalism are tempered by elite actions but 
do result in a partial success.  When elections are held, elites likely commandeer 
the process and cause it to fail.  Election results probably fall along non-civic 
lines (ethnic, religious, etc.), resulting is a non-representative government that is 
very difficult to mend (Higley & Gunther, 1992; Snyder, 2000). 
In the third scenario, transitioners switch to a bottom-up approach, and the 
national elites support the transition.  Transitioners build social capital at the local 
level by promoting equality and trust; this eventually leads to the formation of 
civic and political associations.  During this formative process, elites relinquish 
some power, influence, and status, but are rewarded by an increase in social 
justice and acceptance.  Transitioners slowly begin organizing elections, starting 
at the local levels, methodically moving up the government hierarchy, and 
culminating at the national level.  Because of the support received from elites and 
the presence of civil liberties, these elections likely result in large numbers of 
informed voters selecting a representative government (de Tocqueville et al., 
2003; Fukuyama, 2000). 
In the last scenario, transitioners once again adopt a bottom-up approach, 
but the national elites fight against the transition.  Transitioners’ attempts to build 
social capital are slowed by the intervention of hostile elites, and it takes even 
longer to create effective civic and political associations.  In the process, elites do 
lose some of their power and status but hijack these associations to regain what 
was lost.  When elections are finally organized, the lack of proper associations 
decreases their chance for success.  The result is a non-representative 
government, dominated by elites (de Tocqueville et al., 2003; Fukuyama, 2000). 
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2. Transitioners Payouts for the Four Scenarios 
Using each party’s objectives to evaluate the outcomes described above 
yields the following sets of payouts, shown in Figures 5 – 7. Partial credit was 
awarded whenever an objective was partially satisfied.  Each party’s table 
reflects very different levels of satisfaction.  To start, Figure 5 shows the utility 
payouts received by transitioners in each of the four scenarios. 








Security 15 15 10 12 7
Electoral Process 5 5 4 4 3
Political Pluralism and 
Participation 5 4 2 5 3
Functioning of 
Government 5 4 2 5 3
Freedom of Expression 5 4 4 3 3
Associational and 
Organizational Rights 5 3 3 4 4
Rule of Law 5 4 2 5 3
Personal Autonomy 
and Individual Rights 5 4 3 3 2
Total 50 43 30 41 28
Points Awarded
 
Figure 5.   Transitioners Payouts 
In the first scenario (column one), the two sides collaborate to establish 
democracy using a top-down approach.  Because both parties are cooperating, 
there is very little violence (15 pts) and the transition moves relatively quickly.  
The Electoral Process is executed quickly and independently (5 pts) with a fairly 
large turnout from both citizens and competing parties, and results in good 
Political Pluralism and Participation (4 pts).  In addition, the cooperation between 
transitioners and national elites produces a well functioning government (4 pts).  
Since the top-down approach focuses on the formation of democratic institutions, 
it produces good results in the categories of Freedom of Expression (4 pts), Rule 
of Law (4 pts), and Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (4 pts).  However, 
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because this approach does not focus as heavily on the formation of 
associations, Associational and Organizational Rights are not as prevalent (3 
pts).  In total, this scenario yields a payout of 43 utility points for transitioners.  
In the second scenario (column two), transitioners apply a top-down 
strategy but elites do not cooperate, instead choosing to mobilize the populace 
against the transition.  This results in moderate levels of violence (10 pts) as 
transitioners and national elites both struggle for power.  The Electoral Process 
continues as planned but elites may resort to intimidation to undermine elections 
(4 pts).  Political Pluralism and Participation suffer greatly as elites commandeer 
elections or organize boycotts (2 pts).  The struggle between transitioners and 
national elites manifests further as the government has difficulty functioning 
efficiently (2 pts) and the Rule of Law is displaced by individualism (2 pts).  This 
avenue’s focus on democratic institutions manages to protect Freedom of 
Expression (4 pts), but Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights suffer in the 
struggle (3 pts).  Associational and Organizational Rights remain average (3 pts).  
This scenario supplies transitioners with a total payout of 30 utility points. 
In the third scenario (column three), both sides cooperate to establish 
democracy using a bottom-up approach.  Nevertheless, even with elite support, 
this avenue still requires a long time to develop, and results in the presence of 
some violence as the process drags on (12 pts).  Because of the extended delay 
preceding elections, the Electoral Process is not as effective as it could be (4 
pts). However, the bottom-up approach’s emphasis on developing civic and 
political associations yields excellent results in the Political Pluralism and 
Participation (5 pts), Functioning of Government (5 pts), and Associational and 
Organizational Rights (4 pts) categories.  Unfortunately, the focus on the citizen 
decreases emphasis on the institutions and leads to less Freedom of Expression 
(3 pts) and Personal Autonomy and Individual rights (3 pts).  Finally, the 
cooperation between transitioners and national elites and the manufacturing of 
social capital enables the Rule of Law to reign supreme (5 pts).  This scenario 
yields a total payout of 41 utility points for transitioners. 
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In the last scenario (column four), transitioners use a bottom-up approach 
but elites do not support it.  The result is a prolonged struggle between 
transitioners and national elites with high levels of violence (7 pts).  The 
combination of delayed elections and hostile elite involvement harm the Electoral 
Process (3 pts) while Political Pluralism and Participation suffers from elites 
undermining elections and hijacking the political process (3 pts).  The ongoing 
conflict between transitioners and national elites degrades the government’s 
ability to function effectively (3 pts) and significantly hinders the Rule of Law (3 
pts).  The focus on building social capital and developing associations finally 
pays dividends as Associational and Organizational Rights remain relatively high 
(4 pts).  Unfortunately, a lack of emphasis on democratic institutions hurts 
Freedom of Expression (3 pts) and the prolonged conflict further imposes on 
Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (2 pts).  All factors considered, this 
scenario generates a payout of 28 utility points for transitioners. 
3. Self-oriented Elite Payouts for the Four Scenarios 
When the four possible scenarios are viewed through the eyes of self-
oriented national elites, each outcome offers a very different level of satisfaction.  
Figure 6 depicts the level of satisfaction gained by self-oriented elites in each 
scenario, based on their collective objectives.  Once again, partial credit was 












Power 15 10 12 7 15
Acceptance 10 3 6 5 8
Status 5 3 5 2 4
Total 30 16 23 14 27
Points Awarded
 
Figure 6.   Self-oriented National Elite Payouts 
In the first scenario (column one), elites accept the top-down approach 
applied by transitioners and both parties cooperate to ease the transition.  Elite 
power decreases as competitions for power become more open; but elites still 
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wield considerable influence through the political process (10 pts).  Elite status 
suffers as national elites are made more equal with average citizens (3 pts).  
Finally, elite acceptance also drops to a new low (3 pts), as the populace shifts 
their love and adoration from individuals to organizations and institutions. 
In the second scenario (column two), elites rebel against the top-down 
approach taken by transitioners, resulting in power struggles at the national level.  
This scenario provides excellent opportunities for elites to maintain and increase 
their power base, as they use the conflict to bring themselves to the forefront of 
the national stage.  However, the presence of democratic institutions does help 
to temper their ambitions (12 pts).  Elite acceptance grows as they are portrayed 
as the champions of the people (6 pts). Lastly, elite status is maximized as they 
develop crowds of supporters and move to the center of this high-profile conflict 
(5 pts). 
In the third scenario (column three), national elites support the bottom-up 
approach proposed by transitioners.  In this instance, elites are relegated to the 
level of an average citizen, greatly decreasing their power (7 pts) and status (2 
pts) with no outlets available to recoup their losses.  Fortunately, the 
development of social capital helps elites gain some acceptance from those 
around them (5 pts). 
In the last scenario (column four), national elites mobilize the populace to 
counter transitioners’ bottom-up approach, an approach that is not designed to 
handle this level of conflict.  As a result, elites are able to derail the democratic 
transition, and manipulate it for their own purposes.  This provides opportunities 
for elites to increase their power (15 pts) and places them in positions where they 
can be adored and accepted by the common citizen (8 pts).  While elite status is 
still considered to be high (4 pts), this approach does not provide the political 
structures necessary to maximize this score. 
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4. Servant-oriented Elite Payouts 
When the various outcomes are viewed from the perspectives of servant-
oriented national elites, the results are quite different.  Figure 7 depicts the level 
of satisfaction gained by servant-oriented elites in each scenario, based on their 
unique objectives.  As before, partial credit was awarded whenever an objective 












Honor 12 12 6 10 4
Idealism 12 12 4 12 4
Power 5 4 5 3 6
Total 29 28 15 25 14
Points Awarded
 
Figure 7.   Servant-oriented National Elite Payouts 
In the first scenario (column one), elites work with transitioners to apply a 
top-down approach to democratization.  Because of the cooperation between 
both parties, and the emphasis on democratic institutions, this situation leads to 
the most honorable (12 pts) and most idealistic (12 pts) outcome.  If elites 
choose to adopt the political process, they also have a good chance to maintain 
or increase their power at the national level (4 pts). 
In the second scenario (column two), elites do not accept democracy and 
rebel against the top-down approach.  This scenario leads to moderate levels of 
violence and a national struggle, with elites possessing a good chance of 
increasing their power (5 pts).  Unfortunately, this will usually result in a non-
representative government; one that is not viewed as dutiful and does not 
provide social justice.  As a result, Honor (6 pts) and Idealism (4 pts) are both 
low.   
In the third scenario (column three), national elites accept democracy and 
help transitioners take a bottom-up approach.  This combined focus on liberty 
and equality brings high levels of satisfaction to those who seek social justice (12 
pts).  Furthermore, installing a representative government, the likely result of this 
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scenario, is a dutiful action, which also satisfies those who desire honor (10 pts).  
Regrettably, this scenario does force elites to surrender some power as a 
requirement of the democratic transition (3 pts). 
In the last scenario (column four), national elites fight against 
democratization and mobilize the populace against the bottom-up approach 
proposed by transitioners.  Because of the lack of institutions to curb hostile 
elites, the resulting power struggle provides national elites with the best 
opportunity to gain power (6 pts).  However, this scenario likely results in a non-
representative government or a failed state, with the average citizen bearing the 
majority of the cost.  This is not viewed as honorable (4 pts) or idealistic (4 pts). 
C. THE MATRIX2 
To continue studying the democratization process, the players, courses of 
action, outcomes, and utility payouts described above need to be organized into 
two payoff matrices: Transitioners vs. Self-oriented National Elites, and 
Transitioners vs. Servant-oriented National Elites. 
1. Transitioners vs. Self-oriented National Elites 
The payout matrix depicted in Figure 8 illustrates the partial conflict 
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Figure 8.   Transitioners vs. Self-oriented National Elites Payout Matrix 
When considering these utility values, transitioners have a dominant 
strategy to select a top-down approach and the elites have a dominant strategy 
to always mobilize.  This creates a Nash Equilibrium and likely outcome in the 
top right quadrant with a payout of (30, 23). This probably results in a fractured 
national identity with a non-representative government, a fair amount of violence 
and instability, and an overall failed attempt at democratization.   
To improve on this likely outcome, the matrix should be analyzed for any 
strategic moves.  Because transitioners start the game by initiating the 
democratization process, national elites are in the enviable position of moving 
second.  Despite this strategic advantage, the situation still results in a likely 
outcome of (30, 23).  In addition, neither party possesses a viable threat or 
promise.  
On the other hand, both parties could utilize side payments to alter the 
payout matrix to their benefit.  Self-oriented elites, desiring outcome (28, 27), 
could provide additional incentives to convince transitioners to select a bottom-up 
approach.  To be effective, these incentives must provide enough utility to make 
“Bottom-up” (payout of 28 + incentives) more desirous than “Top-down” (payout 
of 30).  These incentives could be in the form of security guarantees, proposals 
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that promote a successful democratic transition or anything else that affects the 
transitioners’ utility scale.  Unfortunately, many of these incentives directly 
conflict with the objectives of self-oriented national elites and are not likely to be 
offered. 
Transitioners, in an attempt to convince elites to accept democracy and 
secure a payout of at least 41 for themselves, could also offer incentives.  
Examples include powerful positions in the new government, or special titles and 
other status symbols.  To be effective, these incentives must be worth at least 
seven utility points; they must make the choice “Accept Democracy” (payout of 
16 + incentive) seem more appealing than “Mobilize” (payout of 23).  
2. Transitioners vs. Servant-oriented National Elites 
The payout matrix shown in Figure 9 depicts the partial conflict between 
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Figure 9.   Transitioners vs. Servant-oriented National Elites Payout Matrix 
Given these utility payouts, transitioners possess a dominant strategy and 
should always apply a Top-down approach.  National elites also have a dominant 
strategy and should always accept democracy.  This combination results in a 
Nash Equilibrium in the top left quadrant with a likely payout of (43, 28).  This 
outcome is characterized by a stable, peaceful nation, a strong form of civic 
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nationalism, open and competitive elections, and a representative government 
divided along civic lines.  Based on these utilities, this is the best possible 
outcome for both parties.  As long as both players behave rationally and attempt 
to maximize their utility values, democratization results in a win-win situation.  
Because the likely outcome is also the best possible outcome for each 
player, it is impossible to improve on the situation using strategic moves.  In 
addition, no viable threats or promises are present.  As in the previous game, 
transitioners initiate the democratization process, giving national elites the 
strategic advantage of moving second.  Nevertheless, despite national elites’ 
superior position, the likely outcome remains unchanged at (43, 28). 
As before, either player could alter the matrix through the employment of 
incentives and side payments.  Then again, because each player has already 
attained their most desirable outcome, such modifications to the matrix are not 
likely.  Both parties should be content with the status quo and should not risk 
jeopardizing their winnings. 
D. DEMOCRATIZING IN A MULTI-PARTY ENVIRONMENT 
Unfortunately, the democratization process is far more complicated than 
this simple game suggests, mainly because it involves more than two 
stakeholders and often incorporates multiple varieties of national elites.  
Therefore, an examination of an environment where both self-oriented and 
servant-oriented national elites are present would be helpful.  In order to account 
for the simultaneous presence of both of these parties, a few assumptions must 
first be made.  First, the utility scales for all types of elites must be viewed as 
equitable.  An increase of one utility point must represent the same increase in 
satisfaction for both self-oriented and servant-oriented elites.  Second, the 
composition of elites must be viewed as a single, rational entity.  Factions may 
debate over their move but eventually they must come to a unified decision as to 
which move to make and all elites must follow.  
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After applying these assumptions, the concept of expected value may be 
used to adapt the payout matrix to account for a multi-party environment.  Figure 
10 signifies an environment where X represents the percentage of self-oriented 
national elites present in the target nation and Y represents the percentage of 
servant-oriented national elites present in the target nation.  The values of X and 
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Figure 10.   Transitioners vs. Mixed National Elites Payout Matrix 
Despite an environment of mixed national elites, transitioners still possess 
a dominant strategy and should always select a top-down approach.  However, 
the dominate strategy for elites is variable.  When X is comparatively big, the 
dominant strategy is for elites to mobilize, and when Y is comparatively big, the 
dominant strategy is to accept.  This is congruent with the findings from the 
previous section, as self-oriented elites (X) prefer to Mobilize and servant-
oriented elites (Y) prefer to Accept.   






Self (X) Servant (Y) TD vs. A TD vs M BU vs A BU vs M
0 1 28.00 15.00 25.00 14.00
0.1 0.9 26.80 15.80 23.90 15.30
0.2 0.8 25.60 16.60 22.80 16.60
0.3 0.7 24.40 17.40 21.70 17.90
0.4 0.6 23.20 18.20 20.60 19.20
0.4583 0.5417 + 22.50 18.67 19.96 19.96
0.5 0.5 22.00 19.00 19.50 20.50
0.6 0.4 20.80 19.80 18.40 21.80
0.65 0.35 * 20.20 20.20 17.85 22.45
0.7 0.3 19.60 20.60 17.30 23.10
0.8 0.2 18.40 21.40 16.20 24.40
0.9 0.1 17.20 22.20 15.10 25.70
1 0 16.00 23.00 14.00 27.00  
Figure 11.   Mixed National Elite Utility Payouts 
Depicted in this table are the two critical points where the dominant 
strategy for elites switches (* and +).  When transitioners employ a top-down 
approach, their dominant and most likely strategy, the critical point occurs when 
self-oriented elites comprise 65% and servant-oriented elites comprise 35% of 
the total elite population (*).  At this point, elites as a whole are indifferent as to 
which strategy to choose.  However, if less than 35% of the elites present are 
servant-oriented, then the Mobilization strategy is dominant.  Conversely, if more 
than 35% are servant-oriented, then the Accept strategy is dominant. 
If transitioners adopt a bottom-up approach (not likely but still possible) 
then the critical proportion of servant-oriented elites increases to 54.17% (+).  At 
that percentage, national elites are again indifferent as to which course of action 
to take.  If less than 54.17% of the elites present are servant-oriented, then 
mobilizing becomes dominant.  On the other hand, if more than 54.17% are 
servant-oriented, then accepting becomes dominant.  This further shows that 
 48
transitioners are more likely to achieve success with a top-down approach 
because it requires a smaller proportion of servant-oriented elites to be 
successful. 
E. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS 
The results from Chapter II and Chapter III set the table and made it 
possible to describe the democratization process as a game of partial conflict 
between transitioners and two types of national elites: self-oriented and servant-
oriented.  Transitioners are primarily driven by the desire to install a successful 
democracy and have two approaches at their disposal: top-down and bottom-up.  
Self-oriented national elites are primarily motivated by power, acceptance, and 
status, and they have two courses of action available: accept democracy and 
mobilize the populace.  Servant-oriented national elites are faced with the same 
choice but they are motivated primarily by honor, idealism, and power. 
Different scenarios yield different outcomes and different levels of 
satisfaction for each player.  Overall, it was discovered that transitioners have a 
dominant strategy of selecting a top-down approach to democratization.  Self-
oriented national elites have a dominant strategy to mobilize against the 
transition, while servant-oriented national elites have a dominant strategy to 
accept democracy.  Yet, with sufficient incentives and side payments, it is 
theoretically possible to persuade any player to deviate from their dominant 
strategy. 
When the game is played between transitioners and a blend of national 
elites, critical thresholds are identified.  When the percentage of self-oriented 
elites exceeds the critical threshold, elites choose to mobilize.  When the 
percentage falls below the critical threshold, elites choose to accept.  The exact 





V. FINDINGS AND INSIGHTS  
Modeling the democratization process as a game of partial conflict 
facilitates an in-depth look at the objectives of transitioners and national elites, 
the relationships between the various actors, and the likely outcomes in each 
scenario.  It is now appropriate to see if any general findings may be extrapolated 
from this simple model.  When applied properly, these insights could lead to 
more efficient methods when installing democratic regimes and promoting global 
democratization.  While these findings do not present a comprehensive, 
optimized approach to the democratization process, they do provide insights that 
benefit both transitioners and national elites.  The following sections provide a 
brief glimpse into each insight.   
A. THE PREFERRED AVENUE TO DEMOCRATIZATION 
As outlined in Chapter IV, transitioners should always select a top-down 
approach to democratization.  This approach begins with a conscious effort to 
build the middle class through economic development.  Then, it creates a “thick 
web of liberalism” (Snyder, 2000, pp. 316-317) protecting individual rights, 
promoting participation and competition, and ensuring government accountability.  
These institutions allow individuals to develop as citizens, leading to the 
organization of civic and political associations, and eventually culminating in 
nation-wide elections. 
The top-down approach is favored and should be employed by 
transitioners for primarily two reasons.  First, this approach typically provides a 
greater opportunity for installing a successful democratic regime.  It yields more 
consistent results and boasts a stronger foundation because it is grounded in 





etc.) and not on the impetuous minds of individuals (Snyder, 2000; de 
Tocqueville, 2003).  In addition, these democratic institutions provide protection 
and insulation against hostile actions taken by dissatisfied national elites and can 
help mitigate the damage they might cause (Snyder, 2003, p. 320). 
Second, because this approach is more beneficial for national elites, it is 
more likely to be accepted by them.  Elites can gain material wealth from the 
economic development, and can take advantage of the newly installed 
government and political structures to advance their power and status.  Servant-
oriented elites are particularly pleased with this approach because it centers on 
social justice and ideals.  All these factors contribute to a greater probability of 
cooperation and a smaller likelihood of violence; both are key components in a 
successful democratic transition.   
B. THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL ELITE 
Chapter IV also revealed that national elites play a pivotal role in the 
democratization process.  In every scenario, national elites almost unilaterally 
determined the outcome of democratization; when national elites supported 
democratization, it was a success, but when they opposed it, it was a failure.  
Many scholars have argued that elites are one of the most significant variables in 
the democratization process (Diamond, 1999, p. 66; Higley & Burton, 1989; 
Higley & Gunther, 1992; Huntington, 1991) and these findings further confirm that 
theory.  
Therefore, when transitioners are presented with an opportunity to spread 
democracy to a foreign nation, they should not proceed unless they are 
reasonably sure they will have the support of the national elites.  Transitioners 
should be especially wary of self-oriented national elites because they pose the 
greatest threat to a successful democratization.  According to the analysis 
conducted in Chapter IV, transitioners can gain support from national elites using 
one or both of the following methods. 
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First, change the utility payouts.  Since national elites are rational actors, 
they make choices and exhibit behaviors that boost their personal satisfaction.  
When self-oriented national elites choose to reject democratization, they do it 
because that course of action provides the greater utility payout and the greatest 
satisfaction.  By providing incentives that modify the utility payouts, transitioners 
can transform the previously undesirable choice of accepting democracy, into a 
more desirable one.  Chapter III identifies that self-oriented national elites are 
motivated by a compilation of power, acceptance, and status.  For incentives to 
be effective they must focus on these three areas and increase the utility of the 
targeted actor.  Possible options for accommodating elites include powerful 
positions, public endorsements, or prestigious titles.  However, to effectively alter 
elite behavior, these side payments must total at least seven utility points, an 
increase in general satisfaction of almost 50 percent!  Anything less is not 
persuasive enough to tip the scales. 
A second possibility is to change the elite ratios.  As identified in Chapter 
IV, self-oriented national elites generally reject democratization while servant-
oriented national elites generally accept democratization.  Furthermore, the 
presence of servant-oriented national elites, even when outnumbered by self-
oriented elites nearly two to one, typically leads to a successful democratic 
transition.  One approach would be to alter the mixture of national elites until the 
percentage of self-oriented national elites falls below the necessary threshold 
(65%).  This could be done by decreasing the number of self-oriented elites 
through the employment of golden parachutes or other exile options.  Efforts that 
reduce their power and influence may also be effective.  Another approach is to 
increase the presence of servant-oriented national elites by planting them within 
the target nation or by working to boost the power and influence of indigenous 
servant-oriented elites. 
When used in combination, these two methods can be even more 
valuable.  As shown in Figure 12, the payouts for national elites change as the 
mixture of elites changes.  As discussed earlier, when only self-oriented national 
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elites are present in the target nation (100%), an incentive worth seven utility 
points is required to convince national elites to accept democratization.  
However, if the percentage of self-oriented elites is reduced to 90%, increasing 
the percentage of servant-oriented elites to 10%, the required incentive drops to 
five utility points.  The necessary incentive continues to drop by two points for 
every 10% drop in self-oriented national elites.  Therefore, an approach that aims 
at decreasing the presence of self-oriented national elites while also providing 
incentives may be the most effective strategy.  
Self (X) Servant (Y) TD vs. A TD vs M BU vs A BU vs M
0 1 28.00 15.00 25.00 14.00
0.1 0.9 26.80 15.80 23.90 15.30
0.2 0.8 25.60 16.60 22.80 16.60
0.3 0.7 24.40 17.40 21.70 17.90
0.4 0.6 23.20 18.20 20.60 19.20
0.4583 0.5417 + 22.50 18.67 19.96 19.96
0.5 0.5 22.00 19.00 19.50 20.50
0.6 0.4 20.80 19.80 18.40 21.80
0.65 0.35 * 20.20 20.20 17.85 22.45
0.7 0.3 19.60 20.60 17.30 23.10
0.8 0.2 18.40 21.40 16.20 24.40
0.9 0.1 17.20 22.20 15.10 25.70
1 0 16.00 23.00 14.00 27.00
 
Figure 12.   Mixed National Elite Utility Payouts 
C. SCENARIOS LIKELY FOR SUCCESS 
Based on the results of the partial conflict game, two key factors seem to 
increase the likelihood of a successful transition to a democratic regime.  The 
first is the presence of servant-oriented national elites.  The wants and desires of 
servant-oriented national elites are closely aligned with those of transitioners.  As 
a result, this normally leads to increased cooperation between the two parties 
and provides an environment ripe for democracy to take root. 
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The second factor is the feasibility of incentives.  When servant-oriented 
elites are present in large enough numbers, success is likely.  However, when 
servant-oriented elites possess insufficient influence, transitioners must either 
resort to incentives or accept failure.  The feasibility of these incentives is a 
critical factor.  Those that are powerful enough to alter the behavior of self-
oriented elites will likely have a negative effect on the utility of transitioners.  For 
example, offering elites powerful positions within the new government or 
presenting them with public endorsements prior to elections will probably 
increase their utility.  Unfortunately, it may also damage the electoral process 
and impede political pluralism.  Granting elites special privileges may increase 
their satisfaction by boosting their status, but it also hampers equality and the 
rule of law.  Overall, such incentives risk undermining the newly established 
democratic regime, and therefore, incentives of more than a couple points are 
probably not feasible. 
D. THE IRRELEVANCE OF SPEED 
When discussing the democratization process, a speedy transition is often 
a desirable goal.  Rapid transitions decrease the amount of capital transitioners 
must invest, provide benefits sooner, and boost transitioners’ reputations within 
the international system.  Furthermore, recent experiences in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have shown that long and laborious transitions can lead to the 
erosion of domestic support.  Intuition demands that speed should be a deciding 
factor. 
Nevertheless, in this exercise speed was not factored into the equation.  
Transitioners earned no points for executing the transition quickly, and the costs 
of rapid versus lengthy democratizations were not considered.  In spite of these 
omissions, analysis reveals that the top-down approach, the faster of the two 
approaches examined, is still preferable.  However, this is due to its superiority in 
other areas, and not because of its relative transition speed.  Therefore, when 
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transitioners consider initiating the democratization process, they should regard 
speed as irrelevant.  By focusing on building a successful democratic regime, the 
quicker transition will naturally follow. 
E. ADDITIONAL AREAS OF STUDY 
While this discussion has revealed valuable insights about the 
democratization process, it has also exposed areas for further study.  First, this 
model is based on an inductive approach that combines conceptual theories from 
various disciplines to form new theories about the democratization process.  A 
deductive approach using data from various case studies involving 
democratization could be used to test and validate these findings.  This could 
help determine which of these conceptual theories are supported by fact and 
which need further refinement. 
Second, national elites should receive further study with an emphasis on 
determining what drives their behavior.  This could enable the development of 
more accurate personality profiles and could lead to the categorization of 
additional types of national elites.  A third or fourth variety of national elites would 
further alter the dynamics of the democratization process and may provide even 
more insight into this complicated process.   
Third, this model could be expanded to include additional avenues of 
democratization beyond the simple top-down and bottom-up approaches.  In 
addition, elites could be given more courses of action such as “go into exile” or 
“ignore transition” to see how these choices affect the likelihood of 
democratization.   This would result in an AxC payout matrix where A represents 
the number of approaches to democratization and C represents the number of 
choices available for national elites.  
F.  FINAL THOUGHTS 
When transitioners consider democratizing a target nation, these findings 
could be incorporated into their planning to improve the overall likelihood of 
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success.  By gathering descriptive data on the national elites present within a 
target nation, and by tailoring the utility payouts to match the specific objectives 
of each actor, transitioners can build a predictive model like the one created in 
this study.  Such a model would enable them to test and evaluate the success 
rates of various approaches to democratization.  While the predictions may not 
be fully validated, they do present transitioners with new outlooks on the 
problem.  Equipped with this additional information, transitioners will be more 
prepared to spread democracy successfully to a target nation.  Through 
thoughtful application, the United States’ goal of global democratization may one 
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